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Abstract  
This study examines the cumulative abnormal returns of mergers and acquisitions in the 
healthcare industry over the short and long run. The findings indicate that acquirers, on average, 
experience slightly positive abnormal returns in the three day window surrounding 
announcement, but this trend is reversed in the long run. In the year following announcement, 
acquirers experience negative abnormal returns that are statistically significant. This pattern 
occurs in every sub sector within healthcare. The study also finds that transaction and merger 
party characteristics possess explanatory merit with regards to acquirer abnormal returns, but the 
effects of these characteristics and their statistical significance varies by sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In the past decade, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the healthcare industry has 
skyrocketed. In the industry, M&A is a popular strategic response to various challenges, such as 
increasing costs or research capacity challenges. Although M&A is one of the most widely 
researched areas in finance, the subject remains a puzzle. Results of scholarship on shareholder 
returns and post-acquisition performance for acquirers varies significantly. A meta-analysis of 
research on the effect of M&A on performance concludes that “unidentified variables may 
explain significant variance in post-acquisition performance, suggesting the need for additional 
theory development” (King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin 2003).  
The purpose of this paper is to identify the determinants of short and long term outcomes 
of M&A for the overall healthcare industry as well as each of its sub sectors - biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, healthcare equipment, healthcare providers & services, and hospitals. The 
questions that this study attempts to answer are: (1) what characteristics of M&A in the 
healthcare industry lead to short and long run equity value creation and (2) do outcomes and their 
determinants differ significantly by sub sector?  
Past research has shown that because mergers occur in waves that tend to cluster by 
industry, macro trends impact industries differently. While many papers have examined 
differences between industries or even focused on M&A in the healthcare industry, there is a gap 
in research focusing on variations within a certain industry. In particular, studies have not 
examined cross sector differences within the healthcare industry. This study contributes to 
current literature on the subject of M&A in the healthcare industry by examining potential 
outcome determinants for each of the subsectors in healthcare, as well as by investigating intra 
industry differences.  
The data used to test the hypotheses is gathered from various databases available on 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The method used in the study is event study 
methodology employed over different event windows that include the short and long term time 
period surrounding announcement. Like most event studies, the market model is used to 
calculate abnormal return. Analysis is conducted on the overall sample of transactions in the 
healthcare industry, then on each sector subsample. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is first 
tested for significance from zero. Then, attributes of healthcare M&A are tested to identify 
potentially significant determinants of acquirer performance.  
The findings indicate that, on average, acquirers earn a slightly positive return in the short 
time period surrounding announcement. In the long run, this trend is reversed and acquirers 
suffer from significant underperformance. Acquirer returns for each sector follow the same 
general trend and do not vary significantly between sectors. However, the significant 
determinants of acquirer performance do vary by sector, and even companies with similar 
characteristics may experience divergent outcomes depending on the sector.  
 
EXISTING LITERATURE 
This section will first discuss scholarship on M&A in all industries, beginning with short 
term returns then long term performance. Then it will discuss research on the different factors 
that influence outcomes, and finally, studies focused on transactions in the healthcare industry.  
 
M&A Across Industries 
The majority of empirical research on the subject focuses on daily returns during the 
short time period surrounding announcement. However, results vary depending on the sample 
studied. Some determine statistically significant announcement returns, both positive (for 
example, Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 1983; Rosen 2006) and negative (for example, Dodd 
1980), while others have concluded that there is no evidence of significant abnormal returns.  
Research studying the long-run performance of acquiring firms is similarly varied. The 
majority of studies have concluded that acquisitions do not create superior abnormal returns for 
the acquirer. In fact, most conclude that acquirers suffer from significantly negative abnormal 
returns over the one to three years following the transaction (Asquith 1983; Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Mandelker 1992; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001). Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) 
hypothesizes that the negative long run performance is due to the fact that these studies focus 
only on public targets. Their sample includes targets that are private firms and subsidiaries, and 
they find that while long run returns are negative for acquirers of public targets, they are positive 
for transactions involving private or subsidiary targets. However, these results are not consistent 
across scholarship. Multiple studies using a variety of samples have not found evidence of 
significant underperformance (Bradley and Jarrell 1988; Franks, Harris, and Titman 1991).  
 
Factors Determining Merger Outcomes  
Research also focuses on the relation between merger outcomes and varying attributes 
that characterize the acquirer, target, or transaction. These studies attempt to identify factors that 
contribute to merger effectiveness. Most scholarship in this field focuses on transaction specific 
attributes such as the method of payment or acquirer motives for engaging in the transaction. 
However, the results of these studies also diverge heavily, and the exact impact of many of these 
factors is ambiguous. For example, the nationality of companies that participate in M&A deals 
has been identified as an important factor in determining outcomes. Aw and Chatterjee (2004) 
find that cross-border transactions result in increased value, while Moeller and Schilingermann 
(2005) find that international transactions have the opposite effect.  
 
Transactions in the Healthcare Industry  
Perhaps one of the reasons why the results of the studies discussed above vary 
significantly is due to the industry agnostic nature of their samples. There is evidence that 
mergers occur in waves, and within these waves, mergers cluster by industry. However, even 
studies that focus on a specific industry, in this case healthcare, have diverging results. While 
most studies find a slightly positive abnormal return for acquirers in the short run, some find that 
these returns are statistically significant (Nazarova 2020), while others do not (Ohashi 2007). 
Hassan, Patro, Tuckman, and Wang (2007) finds an overall positive effect on short and long term 
abnormal returns, though the effect is only statistically significant for acquisitions, not mergers. 
Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu (2007) attempts to explain these differences by examining product 
capital as a driver of long-term stock returns. They find that product capital, as defined as 
product development and support assets and measured by a firm’s R&D and marketing spend, 
positively and significantly affects an acquirer’s long-term financial performance. Many papers 
that attempt to explain these differences test merger motives as a determinant of outcomes. In 
particular, they tend to focus primarily on research capacity, specifically acquirers that engage in 
transactions as a strategic option to improve innovative output (Aghion and Tirole 1994). Some 
have found a positive relation between innovation-driven transactions and subsequent financial 
performance in the short and long term (Sevilir and Tian 2012; Bena and Li 2013). In contrast, 
(Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson 2007) finds that acquirers do not experience significant positive 
abnormal performance, leading them to conclude that mergers are not a solution for firms that 
struggle with innovative output.  
Overall, there is no consensus on whether M&A creates or destroys values for 
shareholders of the acquiring firm, both in the short and long run. Event outcomes vary heavily 
across firms. Past literature has also shown that there is no single “best approach” for mergers. 
Acquirer returns depend on a myriad of different factors, and outcomes vary significantly 
depending on factors relating to the transaction itself and the parties involved, as well as the 
broader macro environment. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
The following are the hypotheses tested in this study:  
Hypothesis 1: Short and long run average abnormal return for acquirers in healthcare is 
significantly different from 0 
Hypothesis 2: Acquirer CAR can be determined by at least some variables describing 
acquirer characteristics, target attributes, and merger motives at a significant level 
Hypothesis 3: Short and long run returns differ significantly between sub sectors within 
the healthcare industry  
Hypothesis 4: Variables that significantly impact long and short run returns differently 
affect acquirers in different sectors and have varying significance  
 
 
 
 
DATA 
Relevant Transactions Sample Selection 
To form the M&A samples, the relevant transactions are first identified using the “SDC 
Mergers & Acquisition” database by Thomson Reuters. The transactions must meet the 
following requirements:  
● Date Announced: Transaction announcement date between 1995-01-01 to 2017-01-01  
● Form of transaction: The transaction must characterize a real change of ownership, 
meaning the acquirer must hold less than 50% of the target firm prior to the deal, and 
own more than 50% after deal completion. Therefore, only deals coded as a merger or an 
acquisition of majority interest are retained.  
● Deal Status: Deal is completed and closed 
● Acquirer Macro Industry: Macro industry of acquirer is classified as ‘healthcare’ based 
on SIC Codes, NAIC Codes, and overall company business description 
● Target Macro Industry: Macro industry of acquirer is classified as ‘healthcare’ based on 
SIC Codes, NAIC Codes, and overall company business description 
● Acquirer Public Status: Acquirer must be public at the announcement and currently 
trading on the exchange  
● Transaction Volume: The value of the transaction is a least US$1 million  
● Coverage of the acquirer on Compustat/CRSP 
Due to the non-normality of daily stock returns, the sample has a significant presence of 
outliers and high leverage data points (Brown and Warner 1985). Because inferences from OLS 
regressions are sensitive to the presence of outliers and high leverage data points, the data is then 
trimmed (Huber 1973; Yohai 1987). To remove outliers, the firms with the top 5% and bottom 
5% of CARs for the event period [-3,+264] as calculated using the MM model, are removed. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses standard event study methodology to evaluate the short and long run 
share performance of companies that engage in M&A.  
The majority of studies focus on the short time period in the days surrounding 
announcement. However, studies show that exclusively using a short time window for event 
study can lead to serious misinterpretation of merger effects (Oler, Harrison, and Allen 2008), 
because the immediate market response to M&A announcements does not accurately reflect their 
full economic impact. Oler et al. (2008) finds that the market response at the time of 
announcement is often incomplete, but over time, the market will correct itself as additional 
information becomes available. As a result, performance outcomes of M&A only become 
evident in the long run (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker 1992; Loughran and Vijh 1997). 
Therefore, to assess the full impact of M&A and the factors that drive its outcomes, returns for 
both short and long term time periods are included in this study.  
 
Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
This event study is based on abnormal return, which is calculated as the difference 
between the actual ex-post return of a security and the expected return over the event window:   
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) 
where,  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = Abnormal return of stock i at the point of time t  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = Return of the stock i at the point of time t  
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = Expected return of the stock i at the point of time t  
 
The expected return is calculated using the Market Model, which assumes a stable linear relation 
between the market return and the security return:  
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)  =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 × 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
where,  
𝛼𝑖 = Firm-specific component of the return of stock i  
𝛽𝑖 = Sensitivity of the return of stock i towards the return of the benchmark 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = Return of the market index at the point of time t  
 
The CAR for each firm is calculated as the sum of abnormal returns of every day in the event 
period:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅[𝑡1,𝑡2] =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
 
Abnormal return is calculated using the Daily Event Study tool by Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS). 
 
Model Parameters  
This study analyzes an event period of, in total, 268 trading days through 7 different 
event windows. The estimation period consists of the 250 trading days ending 22 days before the 
announcement date with at least 100 non-missing daily returns (Table 1).  
The event window used to evaluate short-run impact is the three day period surrounding 
announcement, denoted as [-1,1].  This event window is recommended by MacKinlay (1997) 
since it allows for spillover effects in surrounding days and does not weaken the statistical power 
of the test. Other commonly implemented event windows, such as [-3,3] or [0], are used to 
further examine returns prior to and during announcement, and to enable a comparison of results 
to existing event studies in the healthcare industry. The event windows used to measure short run 
excess returns are as follows: [-3,+3], [-2,+2], [-1,+1], [0], [-3,0], [0,+3].  
This study also evaluates long run performance by examining abnormal returns over the 
one year horizon following announcement. The event window of [-3,+264] is used, as it 
corresponds to roughly one calendar year after announcement.  
 
Selection of Independent Variables for Multivariate Analysis 
To further study the market reaction to the announcement, as well as the long run impact 
of the transaction, the acquirer’s abnormal returns are regressed on several explanatory factors. 
Three classes of factors are used to explain M&A success: target-specific attributes, acquirer-
specific attributes, and transaction-specific attributes. Table 2 provides an overview of each 
independent variable and its calculation.   
Acquirer Specific Variables 
Sales Performance  
A commonly cited rationale for mergers is sales performance. However, there is mixed 
evidence of the impact of sales growth on merger success, both in the short and long run. Some 
studies have found that sales performance is not a significant motivation for M&A (Higgins and 
Rodriguez 2006), while other studies have found that sales performance has a positive and 
significant impact on stock market returns (Sorescu et al. 2007). Sales performance of the 
acquirer is measured using two variables: Change in Sales and Sales to Assets Ratio. The percent 
change of sales between year t-3 and year t-1 indicates the overall growth trend of the company, 
while the ratio of sales to total assets for year t-1 gives an overall picture of the company’s sales 
power and ability to generate sales with its current assets. 
R&D Intensity 
In healthcare, innovative research is critical to success and future profitability. R&D 
investment is known to be a critical input in a firm’s technical capability and can be used to 
capture a firm’s level of technological investment (Sorescu, et al. 2007). Therefore, firms with 
lower R&D expense ratios are more likely to be acquirers, as mergers can be an opportunity for 
companies with weak research capacity to acquire innovation (Sevilir and Tian 2012). Based on 
the assumption that increased R&D spend leads to higher levels of innovation, the ratio of R&D 
expense to sales for year t-1 is used to measure research intensity of a firm (Rothaermel 2006; 
Kirchhoff and Schiereck 2011). The variable is denoted as R&D to Sales Ratio. 
Profitability 
Another commonly cited merger rationale is cost synergies, and multiple papers have 
found that cost synergies are one of the most important drivers for M&A activity in the 
healthcare industry (Kerler 2000). Merger activity can often be a response to declining 
profitability, as realization of economies of scale would increase margins. Acquirer profitability 
is measured with the Change in Profit variable, which is defined as the lagged percent change in 
operating margin between year t-3 and year t-1. The operating margin is the ratio of operating 
profit and total sales for the year. Operating profit is calculated as the difference between sales 
and total operating expense. 
Operating Cost Efficiency 
As stated before, cost synergies are an important driver for M&A activity (Kerler 2000). 
As a response to increasing operational expenses, such as rising marketing or research costs, 
companies may become acquirers as a way to increase profitability through the realization of 
economies of scale. Operating cost efficiency is measured with Change in OpEx, which is the 
percentage change in a company’s total operating expenses between year t-3 and year t-1.  
Firm Size 
Firm size is a common and important variable to consider when measuring the impact of 
M&A. Overall, literature focusing on the impact of acquirer size on M&A success finds an 
inverse relation between firm size and returns. Smaller acquirers tend to generate higher returns 
for shareholders than larger acquirers do, because larger acquirers are more likely to overpay 
(Gorton et al. 2009). Moeller et al. (2005) supports this hypothesis, finding that small acquirers 
create value for their shareholders, while large acquirers destroy value.  
Firm size is measured in two ways: Enterprise Value and Change in Assets. Enterprise 
value is a measure of a company’s total value and is calculated as the sum of the market value of 
the firm’s equity and net debt. The percentage change in total assets from year t-3 to year t-1 is 
an indication of total firm growth. Sorescu et al. (2007) and Kirchoff and Schiereck (2011) both 
use total assets to evaluate stock market reactions to size-related merger strategies.  
Target Specific Variables 
Target Public Status 
This study also examines whether the target firm’s public status affects the acquirer’s 
financial outcome. Past research has found a significant relation between the acquirer’s short run 
announcement return and the public status of the target. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) 
found that acquirers lose when purchasing a public firm but experience positive returns when 
purchasing a private firm or a subsidiary. Three indicator variables are created to measure the 
target’s public status. Public Target equals one if the target firm in a given M&A deal is publicly 
traded on the announcement date, Private Target equals one if the target firm is private on the 
announcement date, while Subsidiary Target equals one if the target firm is a subsidiary of 
another firm on the announcement date.  
Transaction Specific Variables 
This paper also evaluates whether different merger motives affect merger outcomes. To 
measure merger motive as a potential determinant of returns, an indicator variable is created to 
represent each of the six merger rationales examined. A merger motive indicator variable equals 
1 when all conditions described are met. The motive variables are not mutually exclusive, and an 
acquirer can have multiple motives for a given transaction.  
Strategic Focus Motive  
Research on the impact of strategic focus motives has diverged. Some papers find that 
diversification increases value through risk reduction and economies of scope (Comment and 
Jarrell 1995). However, other papers, particularly those focused on the healthcare industry, find 
that higher strategic focus leads to higher returns through risk reduction and knowledge overlap 
(Sorescu et al. 2007). These studies find that technological overlap has a positive effect on both 
the likelihood to merge and post-merge returns through synergies from combining research 
capabilities (Hoberg and Phillips 2010; Bena and Li 2014). The strategic focus indicator variable 
is determined by the industry relatedness and overlap between the acquirer and the target. 
Strategic Focus Motive equals 1 if the Thomson Reuters mid industry classification of the target 
and the acquirer are the same. 
High Expected Excess Capacity Motive  
Danzon et al. (2007) finds that one of the main motivations for merger activity in the 
industry is the expectation of a future gap in the product pipeline. These gaps cause a decline in 
future revenue growth rate and create excess capacity in the firm’s departments. The study 
measures a firm’s expected excess capacity using Tobin’s q, the lagged percentage change in 
sales, and the lagged percentage change in total operating expenses.  
Tobin’s q reflects a firm’s expected growth opportunities. Therefore, a firm with a 
promising pipeline of products will have a large Tobin’s q, while a firm with few promising 
products would have a lower Tobin’s q. Percentage change in sales is included, as it indicates 
expected productivity of quasi-fixed factors. A relatively slow sales growth rate would imply that 
the productivity of these factors is or will soon be declining. Finally, percentage change in 
operating expenses from year t-3 to year t-1 is included, as cost reduction is a common initial 
response to a projected sales slowdown. Thus, acquirers motivated by high expected excess 
capacity are characterized by a relatively low Tobin’s q, lagged percentage changes in sales, and 
lagged percentage change in total operating expenses.  
To test the effect of this motive on acquirer returns, an indicator variable, Excess 
Capacity Motive, is constructed. Excess Capacity Motive equals 1 if the acquirer meets all three 
of the characteristics described above. The determination of whether a characteristic is ‘low’ or 
‘high’ is based on the variable’s value relative to the mean of the sample tested by Danzon et al. 
(2007). A low Tobin’s q is defined as a Tobin’s q less than 3.03. Low sales growth is defined as 
a lagged sales growth from t-3 to t-1 of less 25%. Low lagged total operating expenses change is 
defined as a lagged total operating expense percent change from t-3 to t-1 of less than 25%.  
 
Economies of Scale Motive 
A common rationale for M&A is the realization of economies of scale in R&D and sales 
and marketing. If achieving economies of scale is the primary motive for a merger, then smaller 
firms would be expected to act more frequently as acquirers than large firms do. To test the 
effect of this motive on acquirer returns, an indicator variable, Economies of Scale Motive is 
created, where indicator equals 1 if the firm size is classified as small (enterprise value less than 
US$1 billion). Danzon et al. (2007) uses firm size as a determinant of the economies of scale 
motive but notes that this motive and the excess capacity motive should be complementary.  
Geographic Expansion Motive 
Geography is an important consideration regarding healthcare M&A. Cross-border 
transactions are often used as a strategic option to facilitate the entry into new markets or to 
expand a firm’s position in foreign countries. Research on the impact of the geographical 
expansion motive on returns is mixed. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) finds that cross-border 
transactions are positively correlated with returns, as they help diversify country-specific 
macroeconomic risks, while Amihud and Lev (1981) find that operational overlap and cultural 
differences limit synergy realization. Kirchoff and Schiereck (2011) and Danzon et al. (2007) do 
not find a significant correlation between the geographic expansion motive and the acquirer’s 
abnormal returns. To test the effect of the geographic expansion motive on abnormal returns, the 
indicator variable of Geographic Expansion Motive is created. The indicator equals 1 if the 
nation of the acquirer and the target are different, signifying an international transaction.  
Financing and Agency Issues Motive 
According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), some mergers are primarily 
motivated by the management’s self-interest. The agency motive argues that transactions occur 
due to management’s empire building aspirations and high access to cash. Therefore, 
management will identify target firms based on ability to increase personal welfare. Accordingly, 
acquirer gain should be relatively small or negative. Acquisitions undertaken due to the agency 
motive are expected to be positively related to a high ratio of cash to sales (Danzon et al. 2007), 
which would indicate availability of financing or imperfect agency concerns. The indicator 
variable, Agency Issue Motive, equals 1 when a firm is classified as having a high cash to sales 
ratio, defined as a ratio exceeding 2.9 (the mean of the sample tested in Danzon et al. (2007)).  
 
Sector Subsamples  
The sample is then divided into subsamples based on the acquirer’s mid industry 
classification on the Thomson Reuters M&A database. The healthcare industry is comprised of 
five sectors: biotechnology (biotech), healthcare equipment (HCE), healthcare providers & 
services (HMO), hospital, and pharmaceuticals (pharma). The purpose of creating sector-based 
subsamples is three-fold:  
 First, it gives the ability to compare event outcomes by sector. Dividing the dataset into 
subsamples allows testing for variation in the short and long run performance of acquirers 
between sectors. It answer the questions: do the short and long run performance of 
acquirers within each sector match the trend for the overall healthcare industry? Are there 
significant differences in outcomes between the sectors?  
 Second, it allows for the determination of whether the explanatory power of each 
category of determinants (acquirer, target, transaction) varies by sector. Are different 
variables more significant in determining outcomes than others? If so, which factors are 
most important in each sector? 
 Finally, it answers whether transactions with similar attributes experience different 
outcomes depending on their sector. Do these variables have different impacts on returns 
for acquirers in different sectors?  
 
RESULTS 
Overall Sample Analysis  
Cumulative Abnormal Return: Significance and Variability  
The data sample includes 871 transactions in the healthcare industry between the years 
1995 and 2017 that fulfill the requirements described above (Table 2).  
Table 3 reports average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), descriptive statistics, and 
significance for each event period tested. The p-values are estimated using two tailed one sample 
t-tests. The study finds that in the short run, acquirers experience slightly positive announcement 
returns, but suffer from significant underperformance in the long run. In every short-term event 
window, the CARs are positive, and for most event windows, the result is significantly 
significant. The slightly positive and statistically significant abnormal returns in the event 
window prior to announcement (0.61% in [-3,0]) can also serve as evidence of price run-up in 
the pre-event period. Asquith et al. (1983) also found significant gains in the days leading to 
announcement. This finding is consistent with the value-maximizing hypothesis of management 
behavior of acquiring firms.  
Table 3 also shows the long run abnormal return for the sample. The average CAR of 
firms in the sample over the event window [-3,+264] is negative 10.30% and highly significant. 
Therefore, on average, shareholders of the acquirer firms lose value from M&A in the long run. 
This result is consistent with other studies on the stock market reaction to merger 
announcements. Rosen (2006) also found evidence of a long run reversal, where the initial 
positive short-run reaction to an announcement becomes fully reversed in the long term, when 
the track record of the merger becomes known.  
The results also show that success of transactions vary substantially across firms. The 
high standard deviations indicate that the CARs are heavily spread out, and the performance of 
the top quartile of acquirers is very different from that of the bottom quartile. This difference 
becomes more pronounced as the time horizon increases. This is consistent with previous 
research focused on transactions in the healthcare industry (Sorescu, et al. 2007).  
Figure 1 shows the mean CAR calculated for the long term event window of [-3,+264]. 
The figure illustrates the initial positive market reaction to acquisition announcement, and the 
subsequent long run negative CAR. The results of the placebo text conducted on the long run 
even window of [-3,+264] further confirm the statistical significance of the returns (Figure 2).  
Overall, the data shows that while on average, short term acquirer return is slightly 
positive and statistically significant, shareholders of the acquiring firm will lose value in the long 
run. However, success of transactions vary substantially across firms.  
Multivariate Analysis of Potential Outcome Determinants  
Acquirer Specific Variables  
Acquirers in the healthcare industry are extremely heterogeneous, as shown in the high 
variance in key measures such as Change in Sales, Change in OpEx, and Change in Assets. The 
set of acquirer specific independent variables explains just 2% of the market’s short run 
announcement reaction and the acquirer’s long term share performance (Table 4). None of the 7 
acquirer specific variables can explain both short run and long run share performance at a 
statistically significant level. The results show that sales performance, as measured by Change in 
Sales and Sales to Assets Ratio, has a slightly negatively but statistically insignificant effect on 
merger success. This finding is consistent with most studies on M&A in the industry, which find 
that sales performance is neither a significant motivation for merger activity nor a significant 
determinant of success. Additionally, R&D intensity, as measured by the R&D to Sales Ratio is 
also negatively correlated with merger performance. This is consistent with past research finding 
that firms with lower R&D intensity are more likely to become acquirers as a way to improve 
research capabilities.   
Target Specific Variables  
Most transactions involve a private target, while just 10% involve a target that is a 
subsidiary of another firm (Table 5a). Table 5b describes the multiple regression results of short 
term (event window [-1,+1]) and long term (event window [-3,+264]) abnormal returns using 
only target specific variables. The results show that, apart from public targets, the public status of 
the target is not a significant determinant of merger success, both in the short and long run.  
Transaction Specific Variables  
Table 6a gives the number of acquisitions based on the merger motive of the acquirer. 
Most transactions are undertaken with a strategic focus motive. Another common reason for 
acquirers to engage in M&A is to achieve economies of scale. 
Table 6b describes the multiple regression results of short term ([-1,+1]) and long term 
([-3,+264]) abnormal returns using only transaction specific variables. The results indicate that 
an acquirer’s merger motive is not a significant determinant of short run market reaction, as 
indicated by the fact that none of the five transaction specific variables are statistically 
significant at the 5% level for short run CAR. However, in the long run, merger motives become 
a more important determinant of an acquirer’s financial performance.  
The regression results show that firms that engage in M&A for strategic reasons 
experience a positive impact on long run CAR. This is consistent with past research that finds  
that technological and sector overlaps between the target and acquirer have a positive impact on 
long run success (Bena and Li 2013). However, the strategic focus factor is only significant at 
the 10% level. Additionally, firms that engage in M&A with an excess capacity motive or 
geographic expansion motive are successful, and experience positive and statistically significant 
CARs over the long term. The positive and significant excess capacity motive variable indicates 
that mergers are a good way for companies to improve research and innovation capabilities. This 
finding is consistent with that of past research (Sevilir and Tian 2012; Bena and Li 2013). The 
results also show that transactions are indeed an effective way for a company to either enter new 
markets in different countries or to expand market share. Moreover, mergers that are motivated 
by management’s self-interest, as indicated by the variable Agency Issues Motive experience 
negative CAR, as expected.  
Overall, multiple regression results illustrate that an acquirer’s motive for engaging in 
M&A is the biggest determinant of long run transaction success. Successful acquirers are 
characterized by a low lagged sales growth rate, strategic focus motive, excess capacity motive, 
or a geographic expansion motive.  
 
Analysis by Subsample  
As explained above, further analysis is conducted on five subsamples based on the acquirer’s 
industry: biotechnology (biotech), healthcare equipment (HCE), healthcare providers & services 
(HMO), hospital, and pharmaceuticals (pharma).  
Subsample Cumulative Abnormal Return: Significance and Variability  
Table 7a gives the number of transactions in each subsample. Most transactions occur 
with acquirers in the HCE sector, while just 5% of transactions involve a hospital acquirer.  
Table 7b and Table 7c report the average CARs and descriptive statistics for each sector 
in the short and long run, respectively. A two-tailed one sample t-test is also conducted to 
determine whether each of the sectors’ abnormal returns are statistically significant. The results 
of each t-test, as well as the respective p-values are also reported in Tables 7b and 7c.  
On average, there is an even distribution of outcomes across subsamples. Average CAR 
in each subsample follows the trend observed in the broader dataset. For the short term event 
window of [-1,+1], every subsample has slightly positive CARs, but only the HMO sector has 
statistically significant abnormal returns. In the long term ([-3,+234]), the average CAR for all 
subsamples is negative and significant at the 1% level. While acquirers in the HMO and HCE 
sector have the highest short run average CARs, they have the lowest long run average CARs.  
Differences between the subsamples are not significant in the short or long term (Table 
8a and Table 8b). The subsample results are consistent with previous studies that have focused 
on different sub sectors within the healthcare industry. Hassan et al. (2007) and Ohashi (2007) 
find slightly positive but statistically insignificant short run abnormal returns for acquirers in 
pharmaceuticals and the medical device industry, respectively. Similar to the general dataset, 
outcomes vary across firms, even within each sector subsample. The variance between average 
CARs of acquirers within subsets again becomes much more pronounced in the long run.  
Multivariate Analysis of Potential Outcome Determinants by Subsample  
Biotechnology Sector  
Acquirers in the biotech subsample tend to have a high growth in sales, total operating 
expense, and profitability, as well as a high level of R&D intensity. Motives for engaging in 
M&A are quite evenly distributed, but the economies of scale motive is the most popular, 
followed by the geographic expansion motive (Table 9a).  
The key determinants of biotech acquirer’s performance differ from those of the general 
healthcare industry (Table 9b). Most factors that significantly explain returns for the overall 
sample are not statistically significant in the multiple regression for the biotech subsample. The 
15 independent variables in the three categories explain 53% of short run abnormal returns and 
33% of long run abnormal returns at a statistically significant level. In the short run, both public 
and private targets have a significant negative effect on acquirer return. Though, in the long run, 
returns are negative for acquirers of public targets, but positive for transactions involving 
subsidiary targets. This result is consistent with that of Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002). It 
is interesting to note that in contrast to the general sample, the multiple regression suggests that 
transaction specific factors have a more significant effect on returns in the short run than in the 
long run. Three motive variables (Strategic Focus, Economies of Scale, and Agency Issue) have a 
statistically significant effect on short run CARs, while only the Agency Issue Motive has a 
significant effect on long run performance. Additionally, in this subsample, strategic focus has a 
negative impact on short run returns, while the agency issues motive has a positive effect. In the 
long run, the sign of the effects are flipped, which is consistent with results for the overall 
sample and past literature.  
  On a category specific level, the set of target-specific variables has the most explanatory 
power in the short run. Target-specific variables explains 12.7% of the acquirer’s short run 
excess returns, at a statistically significant level of 1%. Acquirer specific variables significantly 
explain both short and long run CARs (Table 14a, 14b, and 14c). 
 
Pharmaceutical Sector  
Acquirers in the pharma subsample also tend to have a high growth in sales and 
profitability, as well as relatively high R&D intensity. The primary motive for transactions is 
strategic focus (46%), followed by geographic expansion (36%), and high expected excess 
capacity (27%). Again, the standard deviation for each of these variables is quite high, showing 
that pharma acquirers are also very diverse (Table 10a).  
The key determinants of the pharma subsample’s performance also differ from those of 
the general healthcare industry. The set of determinants significantly explains short run returns 
(5% significance level), but not long run returns. In the short run, acquirers are characterized by 
a low level of R&D intensity and decreasing total operational expense. The multiple regression 
serves as evidence for Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) hypothesis pharma acquirers often use M&A 
as a response to signs of future trouble. As Danzon et al. (2007) concludes, the results of the 
regression indicate that this strategy is not an effective long term solution to struggles with 
research capacity, although it does result in a short term positive market reaction (Table 10b).  
On a categorical level, the set of acquirer-specific variables explains short run returns at a 
highly statistically significant level (<1%), but no set is significant for long run performance. 
This is different from the overall healthcare sample, where the set of acquirer specific variables 
is not significant for short or long run returns (Table 14a, 14b, and 14c). 
Healthcare Providers & Services (HMO) Sector  
Acquirers in the HMO subsample also tend to have a high growth in sales and 
profitability, but a much lower average level of R&D intensity compared to biotech and pharma. 
Over half of transactions in the sector have a private target (56%), and primary motives are 
strategic focus (61%) and economies of scale (42%). In contrast to biotech, geographic 
expansion and agency issue driven transactions in the HMO sector are very rare, accounting for 
just 5% and 1% of transactions, respectively (Table 11a).  
The 15 independent variables in the three categories do not explain HMO acquirer returns 
at a significant level. This is most likely due to the lack of information available on the selected 
variables for this subsample (Table 11b).  
Healthcare Equipment (HCE) Sector 
Acquirers in the HCE subsample also tend to have a high growth in operational expenses 
and profit, as well as a much lower average level of R&D intensity (15%) relative to biotech and 
pharma. Most transactions in this sector are due to the strategic focus motive (67%) (Table 12a).  
The key determinants of HCE short and long run performance are not similar to those of 
the overall healthcare industry. The set of independent variables significantly explains 10% of 
short run abnormal returns and 11% of long run performance. In the 3 days surrounding 
announcement, change in profit and the excess capacity motive have a significant negative effect 
on CAR. In the long run, none of the motive mergers affect returns in a significant way. The 
results of the regression suggest that the majority of HCE acquisitions occur due to motives 
different from those tested in this study (Table 12b).  
On a category specific level, the set of target specific variables explains short run returns 
at a significance level of 5%. For the long run, all three sets of determinants significantly explain 
excess returns, with acquirer specific variables having the most explanatory power (Table 14a, 
14b, and 14c). 
Hospital Sector 
Acquirers in the hospital subsample have a high sales to assets ratio, change in profit, and 
change in total assets. The variable R&D intensity is not applicable in this subsample. Most 
transactions involve a private target, and almost half have a strategic focus motive. In contrast, 
transactions with a geographic expansion or agency issue motives are very rare (Table 13a).  
The set of independent variables explains 36% of short run abnormal return and 30% of 
long run abnormal return, but not at a significant level. Like the overall sample, some transaction 
specific variables do have a significant effect on long run returns, although they are not 
significant in the short term. Both the economies of scale and the geographic expansion motives 
have a significant negative effect on long run returns. The multiple regression suggests that 
markets do not believe in top line synergies for hospital acquirers, and that markets favor 
domestic transactions and believe that synergies are harder to realize for international 
transactions (Amihud and Lev 2002; Moeller and Schilingermann 2005) (Table 13b).  
On a category specific level, the set of variables that are acquirer specific has the largest 
effect on short and long abnormal returns (Table 14a, 14b, and 14c).  
Overall, returns for each subsample follow the same trend of slightly positive announcement 
returns, then a long-term reversal, with acquirers in each sub sector losing shareholder value 
within the year following the transaction. Although certain sectors perform relatively better in 
the short or long run, the differences in the average CARs of the sectors is not statistically 
significant. The explanatory power of each set of determinants does vary between sectors, and 
the significant sets for each sector do not always match that of the general sample. The set of 
transaction specific variables that examined merger motives did not become significant for all 
sectors in the long term. This suggests that even within the healthcare industry, merger motives 
vary significantly between sectors and across firms. The multiple regression analysis also shows 
that even transactions/acquirers sharing similar attributes can experience very different outcomes 
depending on the sector. The different independent variables sometimes have different impacts 
depending on the sector of the acquirer. For example, while the geographic motive has a positive 
impact on returns for biotech acquirers, it has the opposite effect for hospitals. The results of the 
subsample analysis further prove that M&A is an extremely complicated subject area, and 
outcomes vary significantly even within an industry.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Results from this study find that while M&A does result in positive abnormal returns in 
the short run, these transactions significantly destroy shareholder value in the long term. Thus, 
the mystery remains: if on average, M&A destroys shareholder value, why do firms continue to 
do it so frequently? No set of variables tested in the study significantly impact short run and long 
run returns across sectors. In the overall healthcare industry, merger motives do not significantly 
impact short run returns, but they do in the long run. In the year following the announcement, 
merger motives become a significant indicator of long run acquirer abnormal returns. This result 
supports the hypothesis that the effects of M&A take time to be reflected in the market.  
The study also proves that the factors that significantly influence outcomes vary by sector 
within the healthcare industry. Different sets of variables are significant depending on the sub 
sector of the acquirer. Though the factors influencing outcomes are significant, differences in 
sector returns themselves are not.  
The results of this study serve as further evidence of the fact that merger outcomes differ 
significantly by firm, even within a specific industry or sub sector. This suggests the need for 
continued theoretical development on the subject.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 1: Summary of Model Parameters  
Estimation Period Estimation Window 250 days 
Minimum Number of Valid Returns 100 observations 
Gap 22 days 
Event Window (in days) Short Run [-3,+3] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-3,0] 
[0,+3] 
Long Run [-3,+264] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of Independent Variables 
Category Determinant Variables Calculation 
Acquirer 
Specific 
Sales 
Performance 
Lagged percent change in 
sales 
% change in sales from year t-3 to 
t-1 
Ratio of sales to total 
assets 
Sales t-1 / total assets t-1 
R&D Intensity Ratio of R&D expenses to 
sales 
R&D expenses t-1 / sales t-1 
Profitability Lagged percent change in 
operating profitability 
% change in operating profit from 
t-3 to t-1 
Operating Cost 
Efficiency 
Lagged percent change in 
total operating expenses 
% change in total operating 
expense from t-3 to t-1 
Firm Size Growth in total assets % change in total assets from t-3 
to t-1 
Enterprise value Market equity value + Debt - 
Cash 
Target 
Specific 
Public Status 
of Target 
Public target Indicator = 1 if target is publicly 
traded on announcement 
Private target Indicator = 1 if target private on 
announcement 
Subsidiary target Indicator = 1 if target is a 
subsidiary on announcement 
Transaction 
Specific 
Merger 
Motives 
Strategic focus Indicator = 1 if mid industry 
classification of target and 
acquirer are the same on 
Thomson Reuters 
High expected excess 
capacity 
Indicator = 1 if acquirer has low 
Tobin’s q, low lagged percent 
change in sales, and low lagged 
percent change in total operating 
expenses 
 Low Tobin’s q = Tobin’s q < 
3.03 
 Low sales growth = lagged 
sales change from t-3 to t-1 < 
25% 
 Low lagged total operating 
expense change = lagged opex 
change from t-3 to t-1 < 25% 
 Economies of scale Indicator = 1 if acquirer’s 
enterprise value < US $1 billion 
 Geographic expansion Indicator = 1 if nation of acquirer 
and target are not the same 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics & T-test Results – CARs for all Event Windows 
Event 
Window 
Descriptive Statistics T-test 
Average (%) Std. Dev. 
(%) 
Bottom 
Quartile 
(%) 
Top 
Quartile 
(%) 
t p value 
[-3,+3] 0.75%** 9% 3.20% 4.40% 2.39 0.01691 
[-2,+2] 0.54% 8% -2.90% 3.50% 1.9 0.05741 
[-1,+1] 0.68%*** 7% -2.20% 3.30% 2.7 0.006973 
[0] 0.19% 5% -1.40% 1.60% 0.0019 0.2793 
[-3,0] 0.61%*** 7% -2.40% 2.90% 2.72 0.006657 
[0,+3] 0.59%*** 8% -2.70% 3.60% 2.61 0.009191 
[-3,+264] -10.30%*** 36% -34.00% 14.50% -8.37 <0.001 
Note: ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window [-3,+264] 
 
 
Figure 2: Placebo Test Results – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event 
Window [-3,+264]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Regression Analysis Summary for Acquirer Specific Variables Predicting CAR  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5a: Transaction Count by Target Specific Variables 
Target Public Status Number Percent of Total 
Public 365 41.91% 
Private 411 47.19% 
Subsidiary 95 10.91% 
 
Table 5b: Regression Analysis Summary for Target Specific Variables Predicting CAR  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6a: Transaction Count by Transaction Specific Variables  
Merger Motive Number Percent of Total 
Strategic Focus 489 38.35% 
Excess Capacity 222 17.41% 
Economies of Scale 308 24.16% 
Geographic Expansion 218 17.10% 
Agency Issue 38 2.98% 
 
Table 6b: Regression Analysis Summary for Transaction Specific Variables Predicting 
CAR  
 
 
 
Table 7a: Number of Transactions in each Subsample  
Sector Number Percent of Total 
Biotech 78 8.97% 
HCE 328 37.70% 
HMO 186 21.38% 
Hospital 45 5.17% 
Pharma 233 26.78% 
 
Table 7b: Summary of Short Run CARs for each Subsample 
Subsample Descriptive Statistics T-test 
Average (%) Std. Dev. 
(%) 
Bottom 
Quartile 
(%) 
Top 
Quartile 
(%) 
t p-value 
Hospital 1.27% 8.35% -2.00% 4.00% 1.02 0.3142 
HMO 1.26%** 7.10% -2.00% 3.00% 2.42 0.0164 
HCE 0.44% 7.16% -2.00% 4.00% 1.11 0.266 
Pharma 0.34% 7.44% -3.00% 4.00% 0.69 0.4892 
Biotech 0.95% 8.39% -2.00% 4.00% 1.00 0.3191 
Note: ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level  
 
Table 7b: Summary of Long Run CARs for each Subsample  
Subsample Descriptive Statistics test 
Average (%) Std. Dev. (%) Bottom 
Quartile (%) 
Top Quartile 
(%) 
t p-value 
Hospital -21.99%*** 32.09% -42.00% 1.00% -4.60 <0.001 
HMO -15.05%*** 40.16% -46.00% 15.00% -5.11 <0.001 
HCE -6.69%*** 35.31% -32.00% 18.00% -3.43 <0.001 
Pharma -8.85%*** 33.42% -29.00% 11.00% -4.04 <0.001 
Biotech -11.96%*** 39.81% -38.00% 22.00% -2.65 <0.001 
Note: ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
Table 8a: ANOVA Results of Between-Subsample Effects for Short Run Returns [-1,+1]  
Sector (I) Sector (II) Sum of 
Squares 
df F-value P-value 
Hospital HMO 0.001 1.00 1.04 0.69 
HCE 0.016 1.00 0.16 0.14 
Pharma 0.011 1.00 1.64 0.21 
Biotech 0.009 1.00 1.34 0.25 
HMO Hospital 0.000 1.00 0.16 0.69 
HCE 0.004 1.00 2.62 0.11 
Pharma 0.003 1.00 1.83 0.18 
Biotech 0.007 1.00 4.33 0.04** 
HCE Hospital 0.009 1.00 2.32 0.14 
HMO 0.010 1.00 2.62 0.11 
Pharma 0.000 1.00 0.00 0.97 
Biotech 0.039 1.00 10.31 0.00*** 
Pharma Hospital 0.009 1.00 1.64 0.21 
HMO 0.010 1.00 1.83 0.18 
HCE 0.000 1.00 0.00 0.97 
Biotech 0.004 1.00 0.82 0.37 
Biotech Hospital 0.004 1.00 1.34 0.25 
HMO 0.012 1.00 4.33 0.04** 
HCE 0.029 1.00 10.31 0.00*** 
Pharma 0.002 1.00 0.82 0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8b: ANOVA Results of Between-Subsample Effects for Short Run Returns [-3,+234]  
Sector (I) Sector (II) Sum of 
Squares 
df F-value P-value 
Hospital HMO 0.13 1.00 1.18 0.28 
HCE 0.07 1.00 0.62 0.44 
Pharma 0.01 1.00 0.07 0.79 
Biotech 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.88 
HMO Hospital 0.15 1.00 1.18 0.28 
HCE 0.08 1.00 0.64 0.43 
Pharma 0.05 1.00 0.43 0.52 
Biotech 0.02 1.00 0.13 0.72 
HCE Hospital 0.07 1.00 0.62 0.44 
HMO 0.08 1.00 0.64 0.43 
Pharma 0.07 1.00 0.56 0.46 
Biotech 0.03 1.00 0.29 0.59 
Pharma Hospital 0.01 1.00 0.07 0.79 
HMO 0.04 1.00 0.43 0.52 
HCE 0.05 1.00 0.56 0.46 
Biotech 0.54 1.00 6.52 0.01** 
Biotech Hospital 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.88 
HMO 0.02 1.00 0.13 0.72 
HCE 0.05 1.00 0.29 0.59 
Pharma 1.12 1.00 6.52 0.01** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – Biotech Sector  
 
 
Table 9b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the Biotech Sector 
 
 
Table 10a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – Pharma Sector  
 
 
Table 10b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the Pharma Sector 
 
 
Table 11a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – HMO Sector  
 
 
Table 11b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the HMO Sector 
 
 
 
Table 12a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – HCE Sector  
 
 
Table 12b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the HCE Sector 
 
 
Table 13a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – Hospital Sector  
 
 
Table 13b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the Hospital Sector 
 
Table 14a: Regression Analysis Summary for Acquirer Specific Variables Predicting CAR 
for every Subsample  
 
 
Table 14b: Regression Analysis Summary for Target Specific Variables Predicting CAR 
for every Subsample  
 
Table 14c: Regression Analysis Summary for Transaction Specific Variables Predicting 
CAR for every Subsample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
